Threat Actors

aka COBALT LYCEUM, HEXANE, UNC1530 +5

Lyceum is an Iranian APT group that has been active since at least 2014. They primarily target Middle Eastern governments and organizations in the energy and telecommunications sectors. Lyceum is known for using cyber espionage techniques and has been linked to other Iranian threat groups such as APT34. They have developed and deployed malware families like Shark and Milan, and have been observed using DNS tunneling and HTTPfor command and control communication.

aka Twisted Kitten, Cobalt Gypsy, Crambus +11

OilRig is an Iranian threat group operating primarily in the Middle East by targeting organizations in this region that are in a variety of different industries; however, this group has occasionally targeted organizations outside of the Middle East as well. It also appears OilRig carries out supply chain attacks, where the threat group leverages the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. OilRig is an active and organized threat group, which is evident based on their systematic targeting of specific organizations that appear to be carefully chosen for strategic purposes. Attacks attributed to this group primarily rely on social engineering to exploit the human rather than software vulnerabilities; however, on occasion this group has used recently patched vulnerabilities in the delivery phase of their attacks. The lack of software vulnerability exploitation does not necessarily suggest a lack of sophistication, as OilRig has shown maturity in other aspects of their operations. Such maturities involve: -Organized evasion testing used the during development of their tools. -Use of custom DNS Tunneling protocols for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. -Custom web-shells and backdoors used to persistently access servers. OilRig relies on stolen account credentials for lateral movement. After OilRig gains access to a system, they use credential dumping tools, such as Mimikatz, to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system. The group uses these credentials to access and to move laterally to other systems on the network. After obtaining credentials from a system, operators in this group prefer to use tools other than their backdoors to access the compromised systems, such as remote desktop and putty. OilRig also uses phishing sites to harvest credentials to individuals at targeted organizations to gain access to internet accessible resources, such as Outlook Web Access. Since at least 2014, an Iranian threat group tracked by FireEye as APT34 has conducted reconnaissance aligned with the strategic interests of Iran. The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries. Repeated targeting of Middle Eastern financial, energy and government organizations leads FireEye to assess that those sectors are a primary concern of APT34. The use of infrastructure tied to Iranian operations, timing and alignment with the national interests of Iran also lead FireEye to assess that APT34 acts on behalf of the Iranian government.

aka Silver Fox

Void Arachne is a threat actor group targeting Chinese-speaking users with malicious MSI files containing legitimate software installers for AI software. They exploit public interest in VPN technology and AI software to distribute malware through SEO poisoning and Chinese-language-themed Telegram channels. The group's campaign includes bundling malicious Winos payloads with deepfake pornography-generating AI software and voice-and-face-swapping AI software. Void Arachne also promotes AI technologies for virtual kidnapping and uses AI voice-alternating technology to pressure victims into paying ransom.

aka Chinastrats, Patchwork, Monsoon +8

Dropping Elephant (also known as “Chinastrats” and “Patchwork“) is a relatively new threat actor that is targeting a variety of high profile diplomatic and economic targets using a custom set of attack tools. Its victims are all involved with China’s foreign relations in some way, and are generally caught through spear-phishing or watering hole attacks.

Contagious Interview is a North Korea–aligned threat group active since 2023. The group conducts both cyberespionage and financially motivated operations, including the theft of cryptocurrency and user credentials. Contagious Interview targets Windows, Linux, and macOS systems, with a particular focus on individuals engaged in software development and cryptocurrency-related activities.

aka Famous Chollima, UNC5267, Wagemole +5

WageMole is a North Korean state-sponsored APT that employs social engineering and technology to secure remote job opportunities in Western countries, leveraging stolen personal data from the Contagious Interview campaign. Threat actors create fake identities, including passports and driver's licenses, and prepare study guides for interviews, often utilizing generative AI for well-structured responses. They target small to mid-sized businesses and utilize job platforms like Upwork and Indeed, while employing automation scripts for account creation. WageMole's activities include sharing code within their group and requesting payments through platforms like PayPal to conceal their identity.

aka Altered Spider

TeamPCP is a threat actor that has executed a coordinated series of supply chain attacks, compromising widely-used open source tools such as Trivy, KICS, and LiteLLM to deploy credential-stealing malware. They employed techniques like credential harvesting, lateral movement within Kubernetes environments, and audio steganography to evade detection. The group has demonstrated the ability to leverage stolen credentials to propagate attacks across multiple ecosystems, including npm and PyPI, using a self-propagating worm known as CanisterWorm. Their operations have included the use of AES-256 encryption and RSA-4096 for exfiltration of sensitive data.

aka UNC3944, Muddled Libra, Oktapus +7

Scattered Spider, a highly active hacking group, has made headlines by targeting more than 130 organizations, with the number of victims steadily increasing.

RansomHub is a rapidly growing ransomware group believed to be an updated version of the older Knight ransomware. They have been linked to attacks exploiting the Zerologon vulnerability to gain initial access. RansomHub has attracted former affiliates of the ALPHV ransomware group and operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service with a unique affiliate prepayment model. The group has been active in extorting victims and leaking sensitive data to pressure for ransom payments.

UAT-7237 is a Chinese-speaking APT group that has been active since at least 2022, primarily targeting web infrastructure entities in Taiwan. They utilize a customized Shellcode loader known as “SoundBill” to execute shellcode, including Cobalt Strike payloads, and rely on SoftEther VPN clients and RDP for persistence and access. UAT-7237 employs techniques such as credential extraction using Mimikatz, reconnaissance with WMI-based tools, and selective deployment of web shells. Their operations indicate a focus on long-term persistence and stealth, with a preference for open-sourced and customized tooling.

ShinyHunters is a cybercriminal group of unknown origin that is motivated by financial gain. The group is known for its sophisticated attacks against a wide range of targets, including businesses, organizations, and government agencies. ShinyHunters typically uses phishing attacks and exploit kits to gain access to victim networks, where they deploy malware to steal sensitive data, such as names, addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers, and credit card information.

Adversary group targeting diplomatic missions and governmental organisations.

Kairos is an extortion group that emerged with a data-leak site on 13 November 2024, claiming attacks against six organizations, primarily in the US healthcare sector. The group is financially motivated, demanding Bitcoin payments for the secure deletion of stolen files and threatening to leak data if victims do not comply. While no specific TTPs are publicly known, common techniques among extortion groups include phishing and scanning for exposed internet-facing devices. There is a potential link to a user on a Russian-language cybercriminal forum who shares a post-exploitation script, but attribution remains uncertain.