Intelligence Feed

3mo ago · step-security

Recent attacks like Sha1-Hulud and Megalodon have used public GitHub repositories to exfiltrate stolen credentials, leveraging random UUID-named repositories for rapid distribution. GitHub's new public monitoring feature helps detect such leaks by scanning public content across github.com, including repositories not owned by the enterprise. However, this detection occurs post-exposure and does not cover secrets exfiltrated to external attacker-controlled infrastructure or exposed through CI/CD logs. A layered defense combining detection and runtime egress control is recommended to prevent real-time exfiltration.

4mo ago · step-security

A coordinated supply chain attack spanning eight months involved 15 malicious JetBrains plugins that stole AI API keys from approximately 70,000 developers. The plugins, masquerading as legitimate AI coding assistants, exfiltrated OpenAI, DeepSeek, and SiliconFlow API keys to a command-and-control server in Beijing. The stolen credentials were transmitted in plaintext over HTTP, and the attacker's infrastructure remains active despite JetBrains' removal of the plugins and banning of associated accounts.

4mo ago · step-security

On June 24, 2026, a coordinated supply chain attack compromised 20 npm packages within the Leo Platform ecosystem, all published within a 3-second window. The malicious packages contain a CI/CD attack toolkit that steals secrets from GitHub Actions runners, cloud environments, and credential stores, then exfiltrates them using the victim's own GitHub token. The attack uses the same 'Phantom Gyp' technique and obfuscation chain as the earlier Miasma campaign, indicating the same threat actor. These packages collectively receive around 13,600 weekly downloads, posing significant risk to CI/CD pipelines.

4mo ago · step-security

On June 17, 2026, a supply chain attack compromised the @mastra npm organization, resulting in 140+ packages being backdoored through the malicious dependency easy-day-js@1.11.22. This package, a typosquat of the legitimate 'dayjs' library, contained an obfuscated postinstall dropper that fetched and executed a second-stage payload from attacker-controlled infrastructure. The attack targeted high-value AI development environments, aiming to harvest sensitive credentials such as API keys and cloud tokens, with over 1.1 million weekly downloads exposed.

4mo ago · step-security

On June 24, 2026, the codfish/semantic-release-action GitHub Action was compromised via a force-push to a malicious commit, which redirected multiple version tags to execute attacker-controlled code. The malicious payload steals GitHub OIDC and Personal Access Tokens, uses GitHub API commit messages as a C2 channel, and propagates by poisoning AI coding assistant configurations and publishing malicious packages to npm, PyPI, and RubyGems. It also performs lateral movement via SSH and evades detection by using legitimate GitHub infrastructure for exfiltration.

4mo ago · step-security

On June 24, 2026, the simonecorsi/mawesome GitHub repository was compromised by an attacker who force-pushed malicious commits and repointed several version tags to execute attacker-controlled code within GitHub Actions runners. This allowed the attacker to potentially gain access to any workflow running against the affected tags. The attack resembles a prior compromise of the codfish/semantic-release-action repository.

4mo ago · step-security

The Java ecosystem is increasingly targeted by supply chain attacks, as demonstrated by the Shai-Hulud worm's second wave and a malicious lookalike of the Jackson JSON library published to Maven Central. These attacks leverage compromised or freshly published dependencies to deliver payloads such as Cobalt Strike, exploiting the window between publication and detection. Traditional vulnerability scanners are often too slow to respond, making real-time protection critical. StepSecurity now extends its Maven support to GitHub Checks and OSS Package Search to block compromised and newly published malicious Java dependencies during pull requests.

4mo ago · step-security

Multiple npm packages maintained by Immobiliare Labs were compromised on June 26, 2026, with malicious versions published across all major release lines simultaneously. The backdoored packages execute a credential-stealing payload during installation via a binding.gyp node-gyp hook, bypassing traditional postinstall detection. The payload harvests secrets from CI/CD environments, cloud providers, and package registries, and attempts persistence in AI coding assistant configurations. This activity is linked to the Miasma campaign, known for supply chain worm behavior and evasion techniques using the Bun runtime.

4mo ago · step-security

On June 17, 2026, an attacker compromised the @mastra npm organization and introduced a typosquatted package, easy-day-js, into over 140 packages in the Mastra AI framework ecosystem. The malicious package executed an obfuscated postinstall dropper that retrieved a second-stage payload from an attacker-controlled server before deleting itself. This supply chain attack exposed more than 1.1 million weekly downloads, highlighting the need for rapid incident response and source attribution to determine affected systems.

4mo ago · step-security

In March 2026, the threat actor TeamPCP compromised 76 version tags of the aquasecurity/trivy-action GitHub Action by injecting a credential stealer, exploiting elevated privileges to harvest secrets from memory and exfiltrate them to a malicious domain. The same actor targeted other platforms including PyPI packages litellm and telnyx, and previously compromised the Checkmarx KICS GitHub Action using similar tactics. These supply chain attacks highlight a broader trend of targeting CI/CD pipelines to steal credentials and cloud tokens. The attacks leveraged typosquatted domains and memory scraping techniques, underscoring the need for layered defenses in GitHub Actions environments.

4mo ago · step-security

In March 2025, the tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action, used by over 23,000 repositories, was compromised in a supply chain attack that exfiltrated CI/CD secrets via malicious code injected through tampered version tags. StepSecurity detected the incident using its Harden-Runner tool and provided a secure, drop-in replacement, step-security/changed-files, which has since been adopted by thousands of projects. This event highlighted the risks of relying on unmaintained third-party GitHub Actions and led StepSecurity to make its catalog of 500+ maintained, security-hardened actions freely available for public repositories to improve overall CI/CD security across the open-source ecosystem.